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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 09-2338
                              
ELLIOT BATES,
Appellant
v.
PAUL KIMBALL HOSPITAL; SAINT BARNABUS
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; MONOC NEW JERSEY’S HOSPITAL
SERVICE CORP; JACKSON TOWNSHIP POLICE 
DEPARTMENT; STATE OF NEW JERSEY
                              
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 08-05600)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 24, 2009)
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Elliot Bates appeals from an order of the District Court that dismissed his amended
      We treat a municipality and its police department as a single entity for the purposes1
of § 1983 liability.  See Boneburger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir.
1997).
2
civil rights complaint with prejudice.  The District Court’s decision rests on the faulty
premise that Appellees, most of whom had a role in Bates’ involuntary commitment, are
entitled to absolute immunity from suit in federal court pursuant to state law. 
Nonetheless, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint against
Monmouth Ocean Hospital Service Corporation (“Monoc”), the Jackson Township Police
Department (“Jackson Township”) , the State of New Jersey (“the State”), Kimball1
Medical Center (“Kimball”) and St. Barnabas Health Care System (“St. Barnabas”)
(collectively, “the Medical Facilities”), albeit on alternative grounds.
I.
In November 2008, Bates filed an amended complaint against Kimball, St.
Barnabas, Monoc, Jackson Township, and the State (collectively, “Appellees”), alleging
that the circumstances of his involuntary civil commitment deprived him of certain
constitutional rights.  Specifically, Bates alleged that “nine Jackson Township police cars
along with one civilian car with a social worker” arrived at his residence and requested
that he come with them to Kimball.  He alleged that he was taken from his house “against
[his] will,” that he was detained for eight days at both Kimball and St. Barnabas, and that
he was “forced to take medication, being told all alone [sic], if you resist we will write
you up as uncooperative and you will be here longer.”  
      More specifically, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7 immunizes state law enforcement officers,2
screening service or short-term care facility staff persons, emergency services or medical
transport persons, and others who, “acting in good faith . . . [take] reasonable steps to take
custody of, detain or transport an individual for the purpose of mental health assessment
or treatment.”  As defined in the statute, “‘emergency services or medical transport
person’ means a member of the first aid, ambulance, rescue squad or fire department,
whether paid or volunteer, auxiliary police officer or paramedic.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7(b). 
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The District Court granted Monoc’s unopposed motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim.  Thereafter, the District Court granted Jackson Township’s
unopposed motion for summary judgment, granted Kimball’s unopposed motion (treated
by the Court as including St. Barnabas) to dismiss, and dismissed the complaint as against
the State.  The District Court determined that Appellees “are immune from liability
because [N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7] protects law enforcement officers and mental health
professionals who, in good faith, transport or detain an individual for mental health
purposes.”   The District Court also cited to Bates’ failure to allege bad faith on the part2
of any of the Appellees, as well as his failure to “assert a theory of liability against the
State of New Jersey.”  Bates appealed. 
Bates, Jackson Township, Monoc, and the Medical Facilities all filed briefs.  The
State filed a motion to be excused from filing a brief and for summary affirmance.  
II.
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review
of the District Court’s order.  See McGovern v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir.
42009) (standard of review for order granting motion to dismiss); Williams v. Beard, 482
F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (standard of review for order granting summary judgment
motion).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation omitted).  Summary judgment is proper
where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), and we may affirm the District
Court on any grounds supported by the record.  See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805
(3d Cir. 2000).  As always, we liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants.  See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
III.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against “persons” who, acting under
color of state law, deprive a citizen or citizens of the rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution and federal law.  “In a typical § 1983 action, a court must
initially determine whether the plaintiff has even alleged the deprivation of a right that
either federal law or the Constitution protects.”  Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d
Cir. 2000).  Instead of performing an inquiry into the constitutionality of Appellees’
actions under federal law, the District Court simply held that “all defendants are immune
5from liability” pursuant to a state statute: N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7.  This was error. 
A state statute that creates immunity from suit under state law does not define the
scope of immunity from suit under federal law.  See Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 818
(3d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)).  In Howlett, the
Supreme Court rejected the application of “a Florida law that extended immunity from
state court actions under § 1983 not only to the state and its arms, but also to
municipalities, counties, and school districts otherwise subject to suit under § 1983.”  Id. 
The Howlett Court recognized that a State “may not evade the strictures” of federal law
or the Constitution “by denying jurisdiction to a court otherwise competent.”  496 U.S. at
382.  Thus, like in Howlett, here we conclude that        
[i]f we were to uphold the immunity claim in this case, every State
would have the same opportunity to extend the mantle of sovereign
immunity to ‘persons’ who would otherwise be subject to § 1983
liability. States would then be free to nullify for their own people the
legislative decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the
People. 
Id. at 383.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred in finding that Appellees
are immune from suit under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7, and dismissing Bates’ amended
complaint on that basis.  We turn now to an individual assessment of the prospective
liability of each Appellee to determine whether the District Court nevertheless reached
the right result. 
6Claims against MONOC
To demonstrate that Bates is not entitled to relief on appeal, Monoc relies heavily
on the fact that he did not oppose its motion to dismiss.  It also argues that it “is not a
state actor subject to liability for the constitutional allegations [Bates] apparently
pursues.”  Most persuasive, however, is Monoc’s indication that it is never specifically
mentioned outside the caption of Bates’ amended complaint.  Indeed, Bates refers to
Monoc only by implication in describing his transport from one medical facility to the
next, and in complaining that he was unjustly “billed for the ambulance service which
delivered me from Kimball Hospital to St. Barnabas.”  
In short, the allegations in Bates’ amended complaint fail to state a claim of a
constitutional violation that is plausible on its face as against Monoc.  See Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949.  “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”  Id. at 1950 (emphasis added).  Bates’ amended
complaint is devoid of factual allegations concerning Monoc that would support a claim
under § 1983.  Therefore, it was proper for the District Court to grant Monoc’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.   
Claims against Jackson Township
Jackson Township’s sole argument on appeal is that it is entitled to immunity from
suit under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7.  As described above, we reject this argument. 
Nevertheless, Bates’ pleadings are insufficient to survive summary judgment.  
      “Congress may validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity only by doing so (1)3
unequivocally and (2) pursuant to certain valid grants of constitutional authority.”  Horne
7
While a municipality may be liable for establishing a policy or custom that results
in a constitutional violation, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978); Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2007), the
allegations in Bates’ amended complaint do not even imply the existence of such a policy
or custom in Jackson Township.  Moreover, because he did not oppose Jackson
Township’s motion for summary judgment, Bates has failed show the existence of a
genuine issue of a material fact or that he is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.  As a
result, it was proper for the District Court to grant Jackson Township’s motion for
summary judgment. 
Claims against the State of New Jersey
As noted above, the State has moved for summary affirmance of the District
Court’s order.  In the State’s motion, it argues that “Bates does not allege a theory of
liability against the State of New Jersey,” that it should be excused from filing a brief, and
the District Court’s order dismissing Bates’ case in its entirety should be affirmed.  We
will affirm, albeit for reasons of sovereign immunity. 
The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suits in law or equity.  See Cory
v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982); M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated School Dist. Of
City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 2003).   “[T]he Eleventh Amendment defense3
v. Flores, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 2589 n.1 (2009).  It has not done so with respect to § 1983.  See
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).  Nor do the other exceptions
to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply; the State has not consented to suit, and Bates
does not raise any claims “against individual state officials for prospective relief to
remedy an ongoing violation of federal law.”  M.A. ex rel. E.S., 344 F.3d at 345.  
      Based on our liberal reading of Bates’ amended complaint and responsive pleadings,4
and in light of the allegations made in his original complaint and on appeal, it appears that
Bates’ claims against the State are essentially claims of selective enforcement of the
criminal code by the State police, which Bates imputes to the State.
8
sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the
trial court.”  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 1997).  We
conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Bates’ claims against the State
and should have dismissed those claims for that reason.4
Claims against the Medical Facilities
The Medical Facilities’ brief argues that “the record below undeniably
demonstrates that [they] acted in good faith and, as such, were entitled to immunity from
suit.”  As already explained, neither the Medical Facilities, nor any other Appellee, is
entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.7. 
Instead, the District Court should have granted the Medical Facilities’ motion based on
the other argument that they made below: “[a]t no time were [the Medical Facilities]
acting under color of [state law] but as private health care facilities.” 
To state a valid claim under § 1983 against the Medical Facilities, Bates must
9show not only that they violated his federal rights but that they did so while acting under
color of state law.  See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995);
see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (“the under-
the-color-of-state-law element . . . excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful’”) (quotation omitted).  Moreover, “[t]he color of
state law element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not
acting under color of law.”  Groman, 47 F.3d at 638.  The allegations in Bates’ amended
complaint are wholly insufficient to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Medical
Facilities acted under color of state law in conjunction with his involuntary commitment,
and the District Court should have granted the Medical Facilities’ motion on this basis.      
IV.
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we will affirm the District Court’s order
dismissing Bates’ amended complaint.  The State of New Jersey’s motion for summary
affirmance is denied.
